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INTRODUCTION
With the publication of his classic book Imperfect Alternatives' two
decades ago, and even earlier in the articles that preceded it, Neil
Komesar identified a ubiquitous weakness in debates over whether a
particular issue is best handled by courts, markets, or legislation.
Scholars nearly always considered the institutions in isolation, engaging
in what Komesar called "single institution" analysis. 2 Focusing on the
capabilities of a single institution can be deeply misleading. Even if
courts are not well positioned to resolve some kinds of issues, such as
product market flaws that cause relatively small harms to many victims,
they may be more effective than markets or legislatures. Similarly, issues
that play to courts' strengths might be handled even better by other
institutions.
As this Symposium attests, Komesar's work transformed our
understanding of how institutional analysis should be done. To make
matters worse, he not only explained in theoretical terms the importance
of taking multiple institutions into account, but he also showed how it
should be done. In Imperfect Alternatives, his more recent book Law 's
* S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania
Law School. My thanks to Andy Coan, Victoria Nourse, and the editors of the Wisconsin
Law Review for inviting me to participate in this Symposium; to Greg Shaffer, Alan
Weisbard, and the participants at the conference for helpful comments; and to Neil
Komesar for providing the occasion. I have omitted from this Article the personal
reminiscences with which I began the conference remarks on which this Article is based.
I note here only that Neil had a profound influence on me early in my career, both
through his pathbreaking scholarship and through his personal encouragement.
1. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
2. Id. at 6 (defining "single institutionalism").
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Limits, 3 and elsewhere, Komesar has applied his insights to everything
from nuisance laW4 to the United States v. Carolene Products Co.
footnotes and the business judgment rule in corporate law.6
There is one very surprising omission from the breathtaking range
of Komesar's oeuvre, however: he has never directly applied his
framework to crises. The institutional dynamics of crises are
extraordinarily important. Nearly all of America's major federal
corporate and financial regulation has been enacted in the wake of, and
as a result of, crises. To understand American business regulation, we
therefore need to consider how institutions function during, and
immediately after, a crisis.
In important recent work, two prominent scholars-Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule-have partially filled the gap, arguing that the
executive branch has sweeping authority during a crisis, checked only by
popular will.8 Although Posner and Vermeule's theory is compelling in
many respects, they miss several key dimensions of institutions'
interactions in a crisis, in part because they do not directly apply the
Komesarian framework. They overstate the scope of executive control,
for instance, and do not fully consider some of the endogenous features
of the institutional environment, such as the possibility that Congress
will respond to executive overreaching during a crisis by enacting
legislation that ties the executive's hands in its wake.
My aim in this Article is to advance, at least in a small way, our
understanding of institutional choice during and after an economic crisis.
Part I very briefly revisits the recent crisis, emphasizing its institutional
dimensions. Part II identifies three puzzles posed by a crisis for standard
Komesarian analysis. Part III then shows how Posner and Vermeule's
executive-centered theory partially but not completely addresses these
puzzles. Part IV offers an expanded institutional analysis of a crisis. In
addition to exploring the endogenous interactions between the executive
branch and Congress, this Part also argues the courts' choice set is
3. NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001).
4. Id at 11-16.
5. Id. at 61 (referencing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938)).
6. Id at 178.
7. A fine new article by Jonathan Lipson explores other aspects of the recent
crisis-in particular, the choice between administrative resolution and bankruptcy-in
comparative institutional terms. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Epic Fail: An Institutional
Analysis of Financial Distress 74-77 (Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 1201, 2012).
8. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE ExECUTIvE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010).
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broader and more significant than is sometimes recognized. Even if
courts accede to the executive's wishes, as they did in the most recent
crisis, the way a court characterizes its ruling can have a significant
effect on the subsequent development of the law.
I. THE CRISIS
To provide a context for the discussion that follows, I begin with a
very brief refresher on the recent economic crisis-just enough to
highlight some of the key institutional features of the crisis and
lawmakers' regulatory response.
In March 2008, Bear Steams, one of the nation's largest investment
banks, suddenly collapsed.9 Bear Steams's demise began when questions
about its liquidity arose,10 triggered in part by a rumor that Goldman
Sachs had refused to renew the daily repo loans it was making to Bear."
As hedge funds and other clients withdrew their money, Bear's CEO
Alan Schwartz called superlawyer Rodgin Cohen, the chairman of
Sullivan & Cromwell, who quickly alerted Timothy Geithner,
then-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.12 After failing
to line up new financing, Schwartz contacted the head of JPMorgan
Chase and proposed a deal.13 With heavy involvement from Geithner and
United States Department of the Treasury ("the Treasury") Secretary
Henry Paulson, including a $29 billion loan guarantee by the New York
Federal Reserve,14 the parties hastily agreed to a purchase of Bear by
JPMorgan.15
This was no ordinary arm's-length business transaction. As the two
banks gravitated toward a price of $4 to $5 per share, Secretary Paulson
insisted that they lower the price so that Bear Steams would not benefit
from the bailout.' 6 The Federal Reserve ("the Fed") and the Treasury
9. Id at 4.
10. See, e.g., Kate Kelly, Fear, Rumors Touched Of Fatal Run on Bear
Stearns, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl21193290927324603.html.
11. See, e.g., Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, CNNMoNEY (Mar.
31, 2008), http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boydbear.fortune/.
12. Kelly, supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. David Lawder, NY Fed to Provide $29 Billion in Bear Stearns Financing,
REUTERS, Mar. 24, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/24/us-
bearstearns-fed-idUSWAT00917720080324.
15. Kelly, supra note 10; Kate Kelly, Bears Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in
Frenzied Final Week, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB121202057232127889.html.
16. Kelly, supra note 15. The price was later renegotiated upward to $10 per
share after the parties discovered a glitch in the terms of the merger agreement, which
631
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also played an active role in structuring the transaction, which took the
form of a merger in which JPMorgan acquired Bear's stock from Bear's
shareholders.17 To ensure that the government-endorsed transaction
could not be disrupted, the parties added lockup provisions that clearly
violated Delaware merger law.18 The key provision promised JPMorgan
forty-nine percent of stock even if its acquisition fell through, thus
making it impossible for a competing bidder to obtain control.' 9
Although the Fed and the Treasury were the key institutional
players throughout Bear's fall, the judicial system had a cameo role. A
group of Bear shareholders filed litigation in the Delaware Chancery
Court, challenging the proposed merger. 20 Faced with the thorny question
whether to strike down the transaction as a violation of Delaware law and
thus thumb its nose at the federal government, or to uphold the
transaction and thus do violence to Delaware law, the judge did neither.2 1
He abstained from deciding the case, ruling that it should be decided in
New York instead.22
Congress was almost entirely absent as Bear's fate was decided. Its
first major involvement in the crisis came several months later, as fears
grew about the stability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two
government-sponsored corporations that buy or guarantee most home
23mortgages. In July 2008, the Treasury asked Congress to enact
legislation giving it the power to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
if their financial stability deteriorated.2 4 Secretary Paulson assured
lawmakers that, while it was important that he have the powers, he did
not intend to use them.25 A little over a month after Congress passed the
legislation with large majorities, Secretary Paulson used them, seizing
control of both institutions in early September 2010 and putting each in
conservatorship.2 6
could be read as an open-ended commitment by JPMorgan to guarantee Bear Steams's
obligations. Id.
17. Id.
18. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making
Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713
(2009) (analyzing provisions of the deal in detail).
19. Id at 723 n.68, 724-25.
20. Id. at 720.
21. Id. at 756.
22. Id. The best account of this episode is a postmortem by Marcel Kahan and
Edward Rock, who praise the Delaware judge for sidestepping the issue, since there were
serious downsides to either upholding the transaction or striking it down. Id.
23. See generally DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON
THE GREAT PANIC 176-87 (2009) (describing the episode in great detail).
24. Id. at 178-80.
25. Id. at 183.
26. Id. at 186-87.
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Next up was Lehman Brothers, another of the largest investment
banks. Although Lehman was four times as large as Bear Steams, the
Fed and the Treasury refused to bail it out, pushing Lehman into
bankruptcy as last-ditch negotiations to sell most of the bank's assets to
Barclays fell through.2 7 Lehman's bankruptcy caused the Reserve
Primary Fund, a large money market fund that held a substantial amount
of the short-term debt issued by Lehman, to "break the buck"-that is, to
acknowledge that it could no longer assure its clients that they would get
back at least $1 for every $1 they had invested.28 The Treasury responded
to the ensuing panic by putting rescue funding in place for all money
market funds.29
Two days after Lehman's bankruptcy filing, AIG, the giant
insurance and financial services company, threatened to collapse.3o The
Fed and the Treasury put together an $85 billion bailout package (later
expanded to $182.5 billion) to avert a default.3 1 The rescue financing had
a number of unusual features. Most important for present purposes, it
appeared to give the New York Federal Reserve control of nearly eighty
32
percent of AIG's stock, through trusts set up to facilitate the rescue.
The stock feature was noteworthy because the Fed's emergency lending
powers permit it to make loans, but not to buy or sell stock.
In late September, Secretary Paulson asked Congress to enact
legislation giving the Treasury $700 billion to purchase troubled assets
held by the banking industry.34 The direness of Secretary Paulson's
warnings and the paucity of details about the Treasury's specific plans
terrified the markets.35 After the House of Representatives initially
27. See Too Big to Fail: The Role for Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in
Financial Regulation Reform (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial &
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. 69-73 (2009) (statement of
Harvey R. Miller, Bankruptcy Counsel for Lehman Brothers).
28. WESSEL, supra note 23, at 206-07.
29. See id. at 208. During the same period the Fed provided support for banks
to buy commercial paper in order to prop up the price of the commercial paper held by
money market funds. See id.
30. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
943 (2009) (an extensive scholarly analysis of the AIG collapse and bailout).
31. Id. at 944-45.
32. See id. at 966.
33. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the
Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613,
1629-30 (2009).
34. See ANDREw Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND
THEMSELVES 490-97 (2009).
35. See JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: How GOVERNMENT ACTIONS




rejected the proposed legislation, jolting the markets once again, both
houses approved it, and President George W. Bush signed the $700
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) into law on October 3,
2008.36 For the second time in the crisis, Congress had stepped in, each
time acceding to urgent prodding by the executive branch. Although the
Treasury originally planned to purchase banks' mortgage-related assets,
it used the funds to provide capital to each of the largest banks.37
Secretary Paulson insisted that none of the TARP funds would be
used to bail out the auto industry. "The TARP is aimed at the financial
system," he assured Congress a few weeks after its enactment.38 "[I]n
terms of autos, I have said it would not be a good thing."39 After an auto
bailout proposal was swatted away by Congress, Secretary Paulson and
the Bush administration changed their minds. They made $17 billion in
loans to Chrysler and General Motors, enough to ensure that neither
company ran out of cash before the end of the Bush administration and
the transition to a new administration.4 0
At the outset of his administration, President Barack Obama set up
an Auto Task Force to deal with Chrysler and General Motors.4 1 After
reviewing the companies' own proposals for rejuvenation, the
administration ushered each through a "quick rinse" bankruptcy. 42 Rather
than using the ordinary restructuring process, which requires a creditor
vote and a variety of other protections, each company "sold" its most
important assets tp a new company set up for this purpose.43 To finance
the process, the Treasury lent additional TARP funds to each company.4 4
Chrysler served to some extent as a guinea pig for the much larger
General Motors bankruptcy. In each case, the bankruptcy judge approved
the sale transaction roughly a month after the initial filing.4 5
36. WESSEL, supra note 23, at 226-27.
37. Id. at 227.
38. See Wendy Jones, Paulson, Bernanke Testify, Get Grilled, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 18, 2008, 7:25 PM), http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/ news/2008/11/18/4425489-
paulson-bemanke-testify-get-grilled (quoting Paulson testimony).
39. Id.
40. See Michael Giusti, Automakers Receive $17 Billion in Bush Bailout,
BANKRATE.COM, http://www.bankrate.com/finance/auto/automakers-receive-17-billion-
in-bush-bailout-i.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
41. Steven Rattner, The Auto Bailout: How We Did It, CNNMoNEY (Oct. 21,
2009, 9:30 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/21/autos/autobailout rattner.fortune/ (a
somewhat self-serving inside account of the Auto Task Force's work).
42. Id.
43. Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 727, 733-34 (2010) (describing and criticizing the Chrysler transaction in
considerable detail, and the General Motors deal more briefly).
44. Id at 733.
45. Id. at 728.
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Although the automaker transactions are sometimes described as
having been blessed by every court that considered them, 4 6 this is not
quite accurate.47 After the Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy
court's approval of the Chrysler sale, the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court.48 The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit opinion
and dismissed the case but declined on equitable mootness grounds to
rule on the underlying transaction.4 9
Also in early 2009, the Fed and the Treasury conducted "stress
tests" of the nineteen largest bank holding companies. They concluded
that ten were undercapitalized, and committed additional TARP funds to
improve the banks' capital.o
The legislative branch assumed a much more central role in the next
major phase of the crisis, which led to the enactment in July 2010 of the
financial reforms known as the Dodd-Frank Act.5 The reforms gave a
great deal of power to the financial regulators. The legislation gave a
new regulatory council comprised of the heads of the major financial
regulators authority to designate systemically important financial
institutions for special oversight, it gave the FDIC the power to take over
a financial institution whose default might otherwise jeopardize the
financial system, and it created a new consumer regulator.5 2 The
legislation also sought to constrain regulators' ability to bail out troubled
financial institutions in the future, however. Most importantly, it limited
the special lending authority that the Fed used for much of the rescue
financing in 2008 by prohibiting the Fed from using the authority to bail
out particular institutions.53
46. See, e.g., Steven Rattner, Delusions about the Detroit Bailout, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2012, at A27 ("[T]he president's plan was litigated throughout the federal court
system-all the way to the Supreme Court, in the case of Chrysler-without so much as a
nod to the opponents from a single judge.").
47. The misstatement appears to have originated with Steven Rattner, the head
of the Auto Task Force. See id
48. Ind State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
49. Id. at 1015.
50. David Ellis, Stress Tests: Banks Need $75 Billion, CNNMONEY (May 8,
2009, 7:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/07/news/companies/
stress test announcement/index.htm.
51. The Dodd-Frank Act and the effects described in the discussion that follows
are analyzed in detail in DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE
DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011).
52. Id. at 130-32 (FDIC's resolution powers); id. at 106-09 (the new consumer
bureau).
53. Id. at 136 (describing new restrictions on the Fed's use of its emergency




The Dodd-Frank Act was also noteworthy for the extent to which it
delegated final decisions about the shape of the regulation to regulators.
According to one count, the legislation instructed regulators to make 243
new rules and conduct sixty-seven studies.54
The crisis has thus had three major phases: the first was the steps
taken to contain it in 2008 and 2009, which involved primarily the
executive and agencies, whose response included a number of measures
of questionable legality; the second was the enactment of major new
financial legislation in 2010, which centered on Congress and the
executive; and the third is the agency implementation that is currently
taking place and will likely continue for some time.
II. PUZZLES FOR COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
For decades (forty years, by his count), Neil Komesar has urged
scholars and decision makers to take institutional choice seriously,
paying heed to each of three main institutions-markets, courts, and
legislatures-rather than just one.55 Even if an institution is flawed, it
may still be the best choice to handle an issue if the alternative
institutions are even more flawed in the relevant context. 6 Similarly, the
fact that an institution can handle an issue well should not end the
analysis.57 Another institution may be even better.
Komesar's own approach is "participation centered," placing
particular emphasis on the likelihood that the affected parties will make
their interests known to the relevant institutional decision maker.59 Here,
he draws heavily on Mancur Olson's writings on collective action but
with a twist: whereas most legal scholars who write in this tradition have
emphasized the risk of "minoritarian" bias-that is, that concentrated
interest groups will have more influence than diffuse groups-Komesar
insists on a "two-force" model that also considers the potential for
54. Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street




55. See Neil K. Komesar, The Logic of the Law and the Essence of Economics:
Reflections on Forty Years in the Wilderness, 2013 Wis. L. REV. 265, 288.
56. Id. at 301.
57. Id. at 302.
58. See KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 6.
59. Id. at 7-8.
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"majoritarian bias," in which the majority uses its numerical superiority
to shortchange the interests of the minority.o
Although Komesar generally assumes that the parties' interests and
roles are stable, he considers several ways in which they may shift. Prior
to a products liability injury, potential injurers have high stakes (such as
the costs a manufacturer will bear if the government imposes new safety
regulations), while the stakes of potential victims are highly diffuse.6 1
Once a harm occurs, by contrast, the actual victims have very high
stakes, thus making their participation more likely.62 Somewhat
similarly, a party that loses at one point in time may reassert itself at
another. If a legislative majority enacts legislation that imposes costs on
a concentrated interest group, and implementation of the legislation is
delegated to an agency, the interest group may be able to capture the
agency and undo some or all of the costs of the majoritarian legislation. 4
As we shall see, each of these insights is highly relevant to a
comparative institutional analysis of economic crisis. So far so good. But
economic crises also pose at least three puzzles for Komesarian
comparative institutional analysis.
The first is that majoritarian preferences seem to function very
differently during a crisis than at other times. Large numbers of
Americans were sharply opposed to the bailouts of Bear Stearns and
AIG, and they acted as if they had high stakes. This suggests that the
crisis transformed their stakes. But the significance of the transformation
was not altogether clear. For many, it seems to have been a shift in their
perceived stakes rather than a shift in actual stakes.66 The majoritarian
hostility to bailouts also seems to have been less efficacious than strong
60. Id at 65-81 (proposing and defending the two-force approach). The term
"shortchange" is of course loaded. The influence of either a majority or a minority can be
either good or bad, depending on what our goal is. See KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 64-65;
Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
959, 982-87 (1997) (reviewing Komesar's Imperfect Alternatives).
61. KOMEsAR, supra note 1, at 167-68.
62. Id
63. Id at 161-77 (analyzing shifts in stakes and their implications).
64. See id. at 95-96 (increased influence of concentrated groups in
administrative setting).
65. See Conor Friedersdorf, Why the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street Should
Cooperate, ATLANTIC (Oct. 11, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/201 1/10/why-the-tea-party-and-occupy-wall-street-should-cooperate/246413/.
Hostility to the bailouts was (along with opposition to the healthcare legislation) one
cause of the emergence of the Tea Party Movement and also figured in the subsequent
rise of the Occupy Wall Street Movement. Id.
66. Even those who did not lose their jobs or suffer other direct financial
repercussions from the 2008 crisis may have worried about the cost of the bailouts to




majoritarian preferences ordinarily are, because it did not prevent either
of these companies from being bailed out.
The second puzzle is the prominence of the executive branch during
an economic crisis. The executive is almost completely invisible in
Komesarian comparative institutional analysis, which treats markets,
courts, and the legislature as the principal institutions.67 Yet the
executive-both directly and through its agencies-was by far the most
visible institution during the height of the crisis. Secretary Paulson was
the key player throughout much of 2008, and his successor, Timothy
Geithner, was similarly central, both before and after the Obama
administration came in.
The third puzzle is the role of the judicial system. Komesarian
comparative institutional analysis nearly always begins with the courts.68
Although some issues are best decided by Congress, others by markets,
and others by courts, Komesar assumes that courts are the key
gatekeeper-the ones who are actually making the institutional choice.
Komesar does not make Herculean assumptions about courts. Quite to
the contrary, he repeatedly emphasizes that courts' capacity is quite
limited, and that the costs of participation in the judicial process are
high.69 But he focuses primarily on "court-made law,"70 and usually
assumes that judges will decide whether to defer to the markets or
legislature.n Yet the crisis does not seem to have been court centered at
all. In a sense they performed a gatekeeping function, but the courts
seemed to be playing a distinctively secondary role throughout the crisis.
The question I propose to pursue for the remainder of the Article is this:
What can comparative institutional analysis tell us about these three
puzzles and about responding to an economic crisis?
III. THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND
Two prominent legal scholars-Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule-
have offered comparative institutional analysis answers to each of the
puzzles.72 Whereas Komesar focuses primarily on courts, the star of
Posner and Vermeule's recent work is the executive branch.73
Particularly but not exclusively in a crisis, they argue, the executive calls
67. See KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 53-97 (outlining a model of legislative
influence in his chapter addressing "the political process"). Komesar nearly always talks
about legislators when he speaks of the political process.
68. See KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 9 (noting his focus on "court-made law").
69. See, e.g., id. (noting constraints on size and judicial capacity).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., id. at 11.
72. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33.
73. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 8.
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the shots.74 The key issues are speed and legitimacy, each of which the
executive has and the other branches of government do not.75 "The basic
dilemma for legislatures," Posner and Vermeule say, "is that before a
crisis they lack the motivation and information to provide for it in
advance, while after the crisis has occurred, they have no capacity to
manage it themselves."7 The problem with courts is that they "come too
late to the crisis to make a real difference in many cases, and ... courts
have pragmatic and political incentives to defer to the executive."n The
executive therefore can step in without any real constraint from legal
rules or from Congress or the courts. The only real checks are political-
with popular opinion being the main limiting factor.
The first thing to note is how easily the Posner-Vermeule account
can be translated into Komesarian terms. Like Komesar, Posner and
Vermeule highlight the limitations of courts' institutional capacity. For
Posner and Vermeule, the issues are speed and legitimacy, whereas
Komesar emphasizes questions of competence and scale. The terms
Posner and Vermeule use to explain the executive's dominance also are
not far removed from those one might expect Komesar to use. Posner
and Vermeule's claim that the principal constraint on the executive is
popular opinion suggests, for instance, that majoritarian preferences
figure more prominently in a crisis than the preferences of concentrated
interests such as the financial services industry.
How persuasively does this account answer the comparative
institutional puzzles? The strength of the Posner-Vermeule account, in
my view, is that it provides a plausible explanation for the prominence of
the executive branch during a crisis. In addition, their claim that the
executive has considerable leeway to ignore existing law-a concept
they first explored in the national security context-is clearly accurate, at
least as a description of the recent crisis. As noted earlier, the
government-orchestrated bailout of Bear Stearns flouted ordinary merger
law, the AIG bailout arguably violated the Fed's lending powers, and the
car bailouts stretched the rules on bankruptcy sales well past the breaking
79point.
But the account also seems to me to have several limitations. The
first is that Posner and Vermeule exaggerate the executive's ability to
74. See id. at 34-61.
75. See id.
76. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1643 (emphasis omitted).
77. Id. at 1654.
78. See id. at 1679 ("The executive does need to play politics; politics, rather
than law, will place limits on its actions. The executive will have an interest in enlisting
congressional support, which can enhance the credibility of the executive's policies.").
79. See supra notes 18-19, 30-33, 43, and accompanying text.
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ignore law and the other branches during an economic crisis.80 As
already discussed, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the Bush
administration turned to Congress at several key junctures during the
crisis, asking for formal authority to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in the summer of 2008, and for the $700 billion TARP program
several months later.8' Although Posner and Vermeule attribute these
requests to the weakened state of the Bush administration, 82 which was
deeply unpopular by this point, this explanation does not seem especially
compelling. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt hinted that he
might circumvent Congress if it resisted his proposals for addressing the
Great Depression, as Posner and Vermeule note, he consistently turned
to Congress for implementation.84 Similarly, President Roosevelt's
court-packing plan triggered a backlash because it was widely viewed as
flouting the law.
The Bush administration's actions during the crisis seem better
explained as consistent with a pattern of recognizing that the executive
cannot ignore the limits of the law altogether. Similarly, the Obama
administration went to great lengths to package the auto bailouts as if
they were ordinary bankruptcy sales. In each case, legality operated as a
constraint. And this, in my view, was a good thing. There were
substantial costs to abandoning rule of law principles. The car bailouts
seem to have distorted credit markets, for instance, by creating
uncertainty as to whether creditors' entitlements would be honored.86
80. Others have made similar points. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the
Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 777, 795-99 (2012) (giving
examples of constraining effects of framework statutes in the national security context);
Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1407 (2012) (noting
rational-choice reasons for the executive to comply with the law); Saikrishna B. Prakash
& Michael D. Ramsey, The Goldilocks Executive, 90 TEX. L. REv. 973, 985-95 (2012)
(cataloguing congressional, judicial, and other constraints on the executive).
81. See supra notes 24-26, 34, and accompanying text.
82. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1674-77.
83. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address. March 4, 1933, in 2 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 15 (Random House 1938).
84. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1669-70.
85. See JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING MOMENT: FDR's HUNDRED DAYS AND
THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE 322-23 (2006).
86. BRADLEY BLAYLOCK ET AL., THE MARKET-WIDE CONSEQUENCES OF
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 32-33 (2011), available at http://home.business.utah.edu/
finmh/GovIntervention.pdf (finding an increase in the cost of credit in politically
sensitive industries after auto bailouts). Another study found that the cost of issuing
bonds in favored industries went down due to the prospect that these firms may benefit
from a bailout. DENIz ANGINER & A. JOSEPH WARBURTON, THE CHRYSLER EFFECT: THE
IMPACT OF THE CHRYSLER BAILOUT ON BORROWING COSTS 31-32 (2011), available at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/conferences/2011/4-14-
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The consequences might well have been even worse if there had been
less attention to legal constraints.
The second limitation of the Posner-Vermeule account is that they
do not fully consider the importance of endogenous factors as a crisis
develops. They treat courts and other institutions as largely helpless to
resist the actions of the executive branch at the height of a crisis.87 Yet
the likelihood that a court will defer to the executive may depend in
important respects on how the issue in question is framed. Moreover,
even if it accedes to the executive's wishes, a court can do so in a way
that minimizes the violence done to ordinary principles of legality.88
There is a similar endogeneity in Congress's interactions with the
executive. Even if the executive can sidestep Congress at the height of
the crisis, Congress may punish the executive for bending the law too far
by imposing harsher constraints at the next stage, as Congress enacts
legislation in response to the crisis. I will give specific illustrations of
endogeneity in the recent crisis in the next Part.
Finally, Posner and Vermeule are quite vague about how popular
opinion functions as a constraint. They say very little about just how it
influences the executive and other branches. Although I translated their
references to popular opinion into Komesarian terms earlier, Posner and
Vermeule do not explore the nature of ordinary citizens' stakes and
participation in any detail. 89 They also seem to assume that popular
opinion constrains the executive in desirable ways. But it is not clear that
this is necessarily accurate-at the very least, the case has not been
made. 90
87. The qualifiers "largely" in the sentence in the text and "fully" in the
preceding sentence are important. Posner and Vermeule do consider institutional
interactions on multiple occasions. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1677
(noting that despite the Bush administration's weakness at the time of the 2008 crisis,
"Congress did not take up the slack"). My point is that Posner and Vermeule understate
the extent to which particular strategic decisions by each branch shaped the financial
crisis and its aftermath.
88. For specific illustrations of this point, see infra Part IV.
89. For a brief consideration of the role of public opinion, see Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1677-79 (considering the possibility that public opinion
constrained the executive less after 9/11, which involved an issue on which the interests
of most Americans were aligned, whereas the financial crisis affected citizens in more
diverse ways).
90. For skeptical accounts of legislation enacted after a financial crisis, see, for
example, Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REv. 77 (2003); and Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521, 1591-94 (2005).
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IV. REVISITING THE PUZZLES
How might a more complete account of the dynamics of
institutional interaction and of the role of popular opinion shape our
analysis? Answering these questions takes us back to the three puzzles
one last time.
Start with the influence of majoritarian preferences during an
economic crisis. Outside of a crisis, ordinary citizens pay little attention
to the details of financial regulation; it is too complex, and the relevance
of particular rules is not sufficiently clear. 91 But a crisis has the same
effect as a fire alarm in a soporific classroom. Everyone snaps to
attention. Ordinary citizens are galvanized, and they have a much more
direct influence on policy.92
In Komesarian terms, we might call this a shift in stakes, parallel to
a potential tort victim's shift from low to high stakes when she becomes
an actual tort victim. 9 3 But the shift caused by an economic crisis is more
nebulous. Whereas the costs of a tort injury can be quantified fairly
precisely, ordinary citizens' stake in a financial crisis is often less clear.
Some are devastated by a crisis-such as the homeowners whose houses
were suddenly worth less than they owed, or the employees who lost
their pensions when Enron and WorldCom failed-but many initially are
not. For this latter group, the effect of the crisis depends on how it
develops and how it is handled. Their stake is thus probabilistic rather
than fixed; it is a stake with a wide range of variation.
This shift in stakes makes the politics of a crisis more majoritarian
than politics at other times. It is no accident that nearly all of America's
major federal corporate and financial regulation has been enacted in the
wake of financial crises. 94 This does not mean that crisis-inspired
legislation is optimal. The precise stakes of the newly aroused majority
are often uncertain, and the majority may not be acting on full or even
good information. During the recent crisis, for instance, the deep hostility
to bailouts spurred Congress to add a "thou shalt liquidate" requirement
to the provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that give regulators the power to
take over a systemically important financial institution that is in danger
of failing.95 This provision purports to forbid regulators from preserving
91. This tendency and the shift that occurs in a crisis is the central theme of
DAvID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE
AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (2005).
92. Id. at 9.
93. See supra note 61 and accompanying text:
94. See SKEEL, supra note 91, at 9.
95. For discussion and criticism of this provision, see Thomas H. Jackson &
David A. Skeel, Jr., Dynamic Resolution ofLarge Financial Institutions, 2 HARv. Bus. L.
REv. 435, 441 (2012).
642
2013:629 Institutional Choice in an Economic Crisis
or restructuring a troubled financial institution, even if liquidation would
be disastrous.96 Interest groups also may continue to have some
influence, even in a crisis. This was perhaps most evident in the failure to
take effective steps to deal with underwater mortgages during the early
years of the crisis. On several occasions, lawmakers debated an
amendment to the bankruptcy laws that would have permitted
homeowners to restructure their mortgages in bankruptcy, but the major
banks managed to fend off the reform, even at the height of the crisis.97
But financial regulation is far more majoritarian during a crisis than
under ordinary circumstances.
Because majoritarian influence is temporary, it may be undercut if
the implementation of crisis-inspired legislation is delegated to agencies
rather than dictated in the original legislation. As has often been noted,
the recent financial legislation delegates an unusually large portion of its
content to agency rulemaking." As a result, large financial institutions
and other interest groups are likely to have much more influence on its
content than would have been the case with more fully specified
legislation."
With the second puzzle, the prominence of the executive branch at
the height of an economic crisis, Posner and Vermeule rightly emphasize
both the executive's preeminence at the outset of a crisis and the
importance of the executive's legitimacy. But they do not follow the
legitimacy issue as far as they might. The executive's legitimacy is
important when the executive reacts not just to the initial crisis, but also
to the legislative process that follows. At the second, legislative stage,
there may be real costs to having stretched or flouted the rules earlier. In
the recent crisis, the most obvious cost of the Fed's and the Treasury's
legally dubious bailouts was the sharp restriction of the Fed's emergency
lending authority. 00 As noted earlier, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the
emergency lending authority to prohibit Fed loans to particular
institutions, thus precluding the kind of support that was used to rescue
96. See id. at 453 (discussing the new approach). The FDIC has subsequently
devised a "single point of entry" resolution strategy that is designed to quickly
recapitalize and preserve a systemically important financial institution. Id. The strategy is
clearly at odds with the "thou shalt liquidate" requirement, but the FDIC plans to claim it
is a liquidation because assets technically would be transferred to a new bridge
institution.
97. Editorial, What about the Rest of Us?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/opinion/26fril.html?_r-0.
98. See, e.g., supra note 54 and accompanying text.
99. KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 90-97.
100. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing curtailing of Fed
authority under § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act).
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Bear Steams and AIG.'0 Under the Treasury white paper proposing
reform, the Fed's lending authority would have been increased. 0 2
Despite the fact that the proposal came from a new administration,
Congress insisted that the reins on the Fed be tightened, rather than
relaxed.
Finally, what are we to make of the generally hands-off approach of
the courts? To some extent, this surely reflects the institutional
limitations of courts, as hinted at in traditional comparative institutional
analysis and emphasized in the crisis context by Posner and Vermeule.
But here, too, endogenous factors may play a role-and do seem to have
done so in the recent crisis. The disgruntled shareholders who sued to
enjoin the Bear Steams merger sued in Delaware Chancery Court rather
than in a federal court. '0 3 This is standard practice, but it may have
affected the course of the litigation, at least a little. The Delaware
Chancery Court was in an institutionally vulnerable position in handling
a dispute in which the executive branch of the federal government had a
direct stake, since Delaware faces an ongoing risk that federal legislation
will erode the value of Delaware's status as the preeminent state of
incorporation and principal regulator for the largest corporations.10 4 It
was highly unlikely that a Delaware court would interfere even with the
most egregious violation of corporate law under these circumstances. To
be sure, even if the case had been brought in federal district court, only
the most sturdy-spined judge would have dared to interfere with the
government-midwifed merger. But it would have been imaginable,
whereas it was not with a Delaware judge.
A second example of judicial endogeneity arose from direct
interactions between the executive and judicial branches and is for this
reason far more revealing. When the Obama administration steered
Chrysler and General Motors into bankruptcy, the ordinary
reorganization process would have given each class of creditors and
shareholders an opportunity to vote on the proposed restructuring and
would have included a variety of other procedural protections.'s As a
result, a large number of decision makers would have contributed to the
decision. The administration sidestepped this process by structuring both
101. Id.
102. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 76-79 (2009) [hereinafter FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM], available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport-web.pdf.
103. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
104. Mark Roe has written at length about Delaware's vulnerability to federal
intrusion and its efforts to head off federal intervention. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe,
Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588, 592 (2003).
105. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 43, at 734-36 (comparing the safeguards of
sales and of ordinary reorganizations).
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cases as "sales" of the car companies' assets. As a result, the decision
rested entirely on the shoulders of a single bankruptcy judge. It was
highly improbable that a single Article I bankruptcy judge would
interfere with a transaction that the executive branch insisted was
necessary to save millions of jobs in the Midwest, no matter how
problematic the transaction might be under existing bankruptcy law.
In each of these cases, it would have been very difficult for any
court to cast cold water on transactions arranged by the executive branch
during a crisis. But the likelihood of second-guessing would have been
considerably greater if the cases had come before different judges (in
Bear Steams) or had been structured differently (Chrysler and General
Motors). The particular posture of the cases, and the decisions that
produced this posture, seem to me an important part of the institutional
story.
It is also important to consider the courts' role in the overall
sequence of interactions that begins with the crisis but also includes both
the post-crisis legislation and reverberations in future case law and
practice. Even if a court does not strike down the executive branch's
response to a crisis, it can protect rule of law principles by signaling its
concern with executive branch transactions that appear to violate existing
law. At the least, this can reduce the risk that legally problematic
responses to a crisis will cause lasting distortions to the law.
The record of the judicial branch has been quite mixed in this regard
during the recent crisis. Although the Chrysler and General Motors
transactions were highly unusual, both judges treated them as if they
were simply ordinary transactions, different only in scale from
transactions that bankruptcy courts handle every day. This stance is in
one sense quite understandable. A trial judge who voices concerns in the
course of approving an executive branch transaction is inviting closer
scrutiny on appeal-and is inviting the losing litigants to pursue that
appeal. But failing to speak up increases the risk that distortions of
existing law will permanently reshape the law rather than being treated
as one-off efforts to contain a crisis. Following the lead of Chrysler and
General Motors, for instance, future corporate debtors might structure
their bankruptcies as sham sales that favor the interests of some
claimants over others, as Chrysler appears to have done.106
A more recent crisis-related decision is even more disappointing in
this regard. In dismissing litigation by AIG shareholders against the New
York Federal Reserve, a district court judge described the AIG bailout
not only as necessary under the circumstances, but also as entirely
106. See id. at 761-63 (illustrating potential abuse).
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consistent with existing law. 0 7 Because the AIG stock acquired in the
bailout was held by a trust and not directly by the Fed, the court
concluded the Fed did not control the AIG stock. Although the decision
came more than four years after the bailout, at a time when the worst
period of the crisis appears to have passed, the judge did not offer even a
wisp of a suggestion that the Fed's intervention pushed the boundaries of
existing law. The court's form-over-substance analysis can be seen as an
invitation to the Fed to circumvent any legal constraints on its emergency
lending powers whenever it wishes to do so.
Much more promising were the judicial responses on two other
occasions. When the bankruptcy judge in the Lehman bankruptcy
approved a sale (which the executive branch endorsed) of Lehman's
brokerage operations to Barclays four days after Lehman filed for
bankruptcy in 2008, he emphasized that the sale was highly unusual, and
that four days was not nearly enough time to make a fully informed
decision.108 Although he permitted the sale to go through, he underscored
the crisis conditions that shaped his decision and warned the parties not
to treat the decision as precedential in any future case.
Although the posture was quite different, the Supreme Court's
ruling on appeal in the Chrysler case sent a similarly valuable signal. 0 9
The Court did not interfere with the Chrysler restructuring, but it
accepted certiorari, reversed, and vacated the appellate court opinion
before dismissing the case as moot.110 This made quite clear that the
Chrysler transaction was legally problematic, and may have reduced the
likelihood that the lower courts' failure to point this out will distort
reorganization practice after the crisis.
As these cases make clear, even when courts accede to the
executive's wishes during a crisis, the manner in which they do so is
profoundly important. My claim is that the different responses will shape
institutional interactions in the post-containment phase of a crisis in
divergent ways.
CONCLUSION
The response to an economic crisis seems far removed from the
concerns of Komesarian comparative institutional analysis. Unlike in the
107. Starr Int'l Co. v. Fed Reserve Bank of N.Y., No. 11-CV-8422-PAE, 2012
WL 5834852 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2012).
108. See Michael J. de la Merced, Lehman Sale to Barclays Was Proper, Judge
Rules, N.Y. TIMEs DEALBOOK (Feb. 22, 2011, 7:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/02/22/lehman-sale-to-barclays-was-proper-judge-rules/.
109. See Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015
(2009).
110. Id. at 1015.
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typical Komesarian context, courts play a distinctively secondary role;
they are not the most visible gatekeeper. Yet this Article suggests that by
adapting Komesar's insights and by building on important,
complementary work by Posner and Vermeule on the role of the
executive, we can begin to sketch out an institutional analysis of the
economic crisis-an analysis that accounts both for the fluidity of the
stakes of ordinary citizens and for the shifting roles of the relevant
institutions.
* * *
